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REVIEW  
 
of Alexandra Gatto Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights: Obligations under 
EU and International Law (Edward Elgar, 2011) 
 
HOLDING YOUR OWN TO ACCOUNT: EU POLICY CONCERNING ITS 
MNES ABROAD 
 
JULIEN TOPAL * 
 
Alexandra Gatto’s thesis wants to answer one question: how can the European 
Union (EU) “ensure that EU-based Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) respect 
human rights when operating in third countries?” (p.vii) This question is as salient 
as ever today, with increasing clarity that economic development needs to be 
embedded in broader societal values. Human rights breaches, complicity in 
government violence but also the detrimental effect of supply chains on local labor 
standards have put a magnifying glass to both negative and positive obligations for 
MNEs limiting those negative impacts.  However, international law has been 
grappling with a way to conceptualize such obligations within its own confines and 
is confronted by a somewhat disabling doctrinal tradition, ‘weak’ governance in host 
countries and less than willing policy-makers. 
 
It is against this background that Gatto has produced a broad scoped account of the 
developments in international law, through multi-stakeholder initiatives, and within 
the European Union (EU) concerning corporate human rights obligations. After 
arguing for a conception of ‘limited corporate obligations under international law 
and a subsequent expansive set of corporate human rights obligations, the core of 
Gatto’s argument concerns the ECs engagement in the field to date. As a self-
referred ‘normative’ power, the EU should be a leader in the global human rights 
movement. Through in-depth analysis of EU Treaty Law, Regulations, and 
Directives Gatto however provides for convincing criticism of the extent to which 
the EC has utilized its competences. In practice thus there is much talk but only 
small practical benefits. Commendably this work thus is more than (yet) another 
argument on the possibilities of qualifying MNEs as holders of human rights 
obligation under international law. Her interest spans wider to include the legal 
opportunities of indirect measures under EU law of internal and external policy to 
ensure the human rights obligations of MNEs. 
 
The book is made up of 4 parts, the last being the conclusion. Part I provides general 
outline of the topic, containing chapters that provide a theoretical framework, MNEs 
as addressees of international law, and MNEs and human rights law. Part II and III 
represent the core of the book, the EUs law and policy concerning the human rights 
obligations of MNEs. These parts respectively take up the MNE-human rights 
relations within the EU as well as the way in which the relation plays out in the EUs 
external policy. In my opinion the innovative work is done in Part II and III, 
therefore I will focus on these and only shortly comment on Part I. 
 
Gatto opens her book with a long (45 pages) chapter outlining her theoretical 
framework and some of the legal and conceptual issues such a framework has to 
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capture. The chapter suffers somewhat under the amount of issues introduced. In 
summary, however, Gatto gives good reasons that the complex nature of the issue of 
human rights obligations of MNEs multilevel and complimentary approaches. Her 
framework therefore includes non-binding measures, binding legal instruments, and 
complementary in applying direct as well as indirect (through EC internal market or 
commercial policy, or external policy geared at host states) measures. Lastly, MNEs 
should be ascribed human rights obligations according to the theory of indivisibility 
of human rights. This means that MNEs hold obligations or should be regulated in 
such a way that they contribute to all types of human rights. Following UN Special 
Representative John Ruggie’s, Gatto specifies human rights into duties to respect, 
promote, protect and support. This is not the clearest part of the chapter, however I 
do not think that too much weighs on it in the end, due to Gatto’s further 
developments in the book. 
 
The subsequent 2 chapters develop the general international approaches to MNE 
human rights obligations. Chapter 2 touches on the ‘obligatory’ topic of the 
evolution of the concept of ‘subject’ and legal personality under international law 
since the Second World War. Topically, Gatto sketches the congruence between the 
progressive increase of corporate rights and the ‘conservatism’ concerning their 
obligations. Chapter 3 extends on the analysis by introducing two ways in which 
international human rights law has developed. These are discussed with an eye on 
applying these as ‘models’ for developing an account of corporate obligations. Gatto 
accounts for the increased focus on horizontal application of human rights law, i.e. 
the state responsibility to ensure human rights within its territory. Cases concerning 
investment projects that impede on indigenous people’s tribal lands are one such 
recent novelty. The second development consists of the emergence of the individual 
on the international legal scene. Especially under criminal law and humanitarian 
law, individuals have come within the scope of international law. Neither of these 
‘models’ are directly applicable to the MNE however since it cannot be easily 
conceptualized as either a state-like entity or an individual. Up to date therefore, on 
the one hand, somewhat creative solutions stretching either the notion of state 
obligations or international criminal responsibility have been used to capture 
corporate human rights obligations. On the other hand, ‘soft’ law approaches have 
been used to determine more precisely how MNEs could be taken as holders of 
obligations under international law, culminating in, at least in Gatto’s view, the UN 
Norms. In these two developments, Gatto sees a ‘limited personality’ for MNEs 
appearing – although this is not explicitly specified. 
 
The core the book concerns a critical analysis of indirect corporate human rights 
obligations through efforts by the EC. Part II delves into the ways the EC has 
applied internal policy measures to pursue this goal. Part III accounts for the ECs 
external policy measure to strengthen host states capacity to ensure respect for 
human rights by MNEs.  
 
The salience of this topic is clear: the EU has positioned itself as a ‘normative’ power 
that seeks to create a value-based system of global governance. Its role in embedding 
MNEs into societal values such as human rights can be seen as a test-case of this 
self-proclaimed power. Gatto concludes that the EC has not lived up to the hype. As 
she argues in light of internal measures, “there do not seem to be many obstacles to 
directly imposing human rights obligations upon European MNEs and applying 
them extraterritorially to European companies […].” (p. 132) The fact that MNEs 
are recognized as subjects of EU law, that they are conceptualized as economic units 
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(instead of the more diffuse concept of a legal unit), and that the EU has applied 
competition law extraterritorially already supports this claim. Chapter 5 neatly 
shows that the EC has not fully explored the opportunities that are legally within its 
reach by way of analysis of competences such as common commercial policy and 
company law, social policy and public procurement. Take the inclusion of social 
concerns in public procurement. The EC could make respect for human rights 
through the supply chain a condition of contracting. Such an approach flies in the 
face of the accepted doctrine of economic advantageousness as the sole basis for 
assigning contracts and might raise worries of discriminatory policy and 
protectionism. But while ECJ rulings allow for non-discriminatory social concern-
inclusion and the leeway provided under the WTOs Plurilateral Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA) the EC has held on to a restrictive interpretation of 
their policy space. 
 
One important caveat is in place. The powers of the EC are ‘conferred’ powers; 
severely limiting the legal basis for ascribing the EC general powers over human 
rights.1 In other words, the EC itself does not have the competence to legislate 
directly on human rights. But Gatto convincingly shows however that there is 
enough of a legal basis within the ECs competences to ensure compliance with 
human rights within and by its own institutions. 
 
The third part of Gatto’s argument brings us to the legal basis and application of EC 
competences in its external relations. Here too, the EC has ample space to draw on 
implied powers. More so, however, than in the case of the European Common 
Market-policies, an argument of coherence can be made that policy should ensure 
MNE human rights compliance. As Gatto deduces from European Treaty law in 
light of Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), all EC external policy 
should contribute to the respect for human rights (p. 200-201).  
 
In this sphere the EC has two main approaches at hand to ensure respect for human 
rights by MNEs. The first measure is the use of a human rights clause in external 
agreements. These clauses introduce conditionality requiring a host state to 
commitment (‘respect’ for) to human rights within its territory. The EC also applies 
non-regulatory instruments, from incentivizing human rights policies in third 
countries to strengthening civil society. The question is however to what extent 
these two types of instruments effectively apply to the human rights obligations of 
MNEs. In chapter 8 Gatto discusses initiatives under these instruments and notes 
that notwithstanding the recognition of the importance of MNEs respecting human 
rights, none of these initiatives explicitly address MNEs. The concept of indirect 
approaches to corporate human rights obligations turns out somewhat empty – the 
fact that an improved host state’s human rights record most probably also implies 
that corporate human rights breaches will be minimized is neither here nor there. 
As an alternative route, the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) allows the EC to 
introduce unilateral trade measure to further human rights. Through the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GPS), an enabling clause that provides an 
exemptions of the Most Favorite Nation-clause of the GATT, the EC has offered 
preferential trade arrangements and capacity building to incentivize developing 
                                                 
1 Opinion 2/94 on the possible accession of the EC to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
provides the background for this caveat. Accession would imply the “entry of the Community into a 
distinct international institutional system, as well as integration of all the ECHR provisions into the 
Community legal order.” (p. 115) Such constitutional change can only be brought about by a Treaty 
amendment. 
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countries to ensure human rights. Tariff reductions and tax exemptions are offered 
to developing country in exchange to ratifications of human rights and labor 
standard treaties under this policy. The GSP is a potent incentive mechanism even 
though it suffers from some implementation and monitoring. Crucially however, 
Gatto notes, also in the case of the GSP the EC has not centered its attention on 
MNEs as such. Yet again thus, improvements of MNEs human rights records are 
expected to automatically follow those of the host country in which they operate. 
 
Gatto’s in-depth account of the potential and the shortcomings of EC policies, show 
some crucial weaknesses in the current role of the EC in furthering human rights 
globally. The oddity with this analysis is that the initiatives discussed, in Gatto’s 
own words, do not (or barely) pay attention to the inclusion of human rights 
obligations of MNEs. The main actor, the MNE, is largely missing in action in the 
core parts of the argument. It is not surprising then that in her conclusions Gatto’s 
recommendations aim at an improved focus on the issue of corporate human rights 
obligations. The problem within the EU does not concern a lack of legal possibilities, 
as Article 6 of the TEU confirms, but a lack of political will. Such unwilling attitude 
is exemplified by the limited use of competences and in the Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR)-program of the EC. To be complemented on its efforts in 
getting multiple stakeholders involved, the EC went off track in picking favorites 
with its Business Alliance for CSR-initiative and opting for a merely voluntary 
market based CSR-model. Gatto urges the EC therefore to develop its laws in sync 
with the evolving consensus in international law that human rights obligations of 
MNEs have to be secured. Secondly, she recommends the EC to utilize the legal 
competence it possesses to extend its policing powers to promote MNE obligations 
in third countries. 
 
To conclude I want to make three critical observations. The first concerns the up-to-
date-ness of the argument. Gatto book is based on her PhD that was submitted in 
2007. There is thus a 4-year gap between the thesis and the current publication, in 
which a dynamic field as the one under scrutiny are bound to have taken place. The 
fact is however that very little to almost no updating has been done for the current 
publication. Did the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty change any relevant 
aspects of EC policy? And the Cotonou Agreement has seen revisions in 2005 and 
2010 – Gatto’s references end in the year 2000. Gatto urges the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
(p.158) to rigorously include social and envirnmental values in their project 
assessments. The EIB for instance, under its 2009 ‘EIB Statement of Environmental 
and Social Principles and Standards’ follows 3 Environmental and Social Principles 
to assess projects for financing. 2 Similarly, the secondary literature latest reference 
is a forthcoming article (published in 2007) and there are only 13 references to 
sources dating after 2005. This does not disqualify Gatto’s account but it does leave 
the reader wonder about what has come ever since she wrote up her account. 
 
Second, a question left unaddressed concerns the reasons that the EC could possibly 
have to limit its actions towards specifying human rights obligations of MNEs. 
Besides potential conflict between the EC and member-states on competences and 
overarching interference in third countries, little probing into such considerations is 
offered. The EC might have good reasons to further going regulations – directly and 
indirectly. The availability of legal opportunities does not make for good or feasible 
                                                 
2 See http://www.eib.org/attachments/strategies/eib_statement_esps_en.pdf. 
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regulations (yet). Gatto’s argument therefore remains nothing more but also nothing 
less than a formal-legal argument that convincingly shows that there are few legal 
obstacles to the EC competences to further MNEs human rights obligations. 
 
Of course, the disciplinary rationale of law expectedly seeks out legal argument. 
However, thirdly, the book could have benefited from a more specific analysis of how 
a more focused engagement with MNEs can play a constitutive role in the 
development of a state and the ensuring of human rights. Such an argument would 
look into the very specific issues pertaining to the corporate presence within a 
country. This comment connects to the conceptual foundations presented in part I of 
the thesis. Gatto holds strong to the idea of indivisibility of human rights and a 
gradational approach in ascribing them to companies, while at the same time she 
develops a differentiated register of types of obligations (from respect to promote) 
that should be promoted through both voluntary and legal means.3  
 
Although commendable, such an expansive and rigorous account of human rights 
might not be most practicable in improving the ECs internal and external relations 
to promote human rights obligations of MNEs – nor does Gatto’s core argument 
seemingly need it. In the conclusion of part I, Gatto builds this expansive set of 
human rights obligations on a notion of ‘limited corporate personality’ under 
international law. Potentially overreaching on this limited fundament, she ascribes 
MNEs both negative and positive duties to respect, protect, fulfill, support, and 
promote human rights albeit according to a ‘sliding scale’ (p. 96; which I reckon is 
equal to the ‘principle of graduation’ (p.vii)), which makes the ‘scope and intensity’ of 
the duty dependent on the right at hand, the capacity to impact, the exercise of 
governmental authority by the MNE and the presence or absence of fault. 
Throughout the book Gatto apparently loosens up on this rigid framework when she 
specifically addresses harm/violation or development/poverty abatement potentials 
of MNEs. Her ‘principle of gradation’ for instance is made dependent on the 
‘distance to the victim,’ the latter notion normally being associated with negative 
duties of harm.  
 
Despite the commendable doctrine of the ‘indivisibility’ of human rights, the two 
broad categories of duties simply translate into very different policy measures and 
legal adjustments. A more differentiated approach will be more successful in practice 
since it allows for a better alignment of initiatives and specific human rights goals, 
and seeking out complementary approaches to make means connect to the desired 
end. 
 
                                                 
3 On p.188 Gatto seemingly lashes out against voluntary approaches that lack convincing monitoring 
and enforcement measures since they are necessarily harmless to companies and of no help to workers 
and communities. For someone who contends to support a ‘mixed-bag’ approach to MNE obligations 
it is a surprising critique that does not sit well either with the important transitional and indirect 
value in civil liability procedures these voluntary means can have according to the author herself 
(p.99 and 188 for instance). 
